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INTRODUCTION
Upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the
emergence of numerous successor states struggling to

rapidly and effectively undergo the transition from a
command to a market economy, attraction and effective

regulation of foreign direct and portfolio investment have
gained special significance in the Central and Eastern

European countries and the former Soviet Union republics.
These nations have made significant progress in opening
their economies and developing a supportive legal framework
for foreign investment. However, given the levels of

investment in other successful developing countries, there
is no doubt that Ukraine,

states,

together with other CIS and CEE

is facing vigorous competition in attracting

foreign capital which it drastically needs to restructure
and modernize its economy. Yet, due to recent financial
turmoil,

the expansion of global financing has slowed,

making competition for foreign financial and human capital,

technology and know-how even tighter.
At the beginning of the post-communist era,

the legal

regime governing foreign investment in Ukraine had somewhat

unbalanced elements. The Ukrainian central government was
keenly aware of the need for Western capital to build a
market economy firmly established on progressive market-

based economic and legal models, yet it remained sensitive
to the political moods of the then majority whose ideas

were tainted with the vestiges of communist ideology. Now
most of those attitudes seem to be history and issues of

attraction of foreign direct and portfolio investment,
technology, know-how and management skills enjoy a high

priority in Ukrainian national economic policies. For the
past eight years Ukraine has been putting forth great

efforts to build a free market economy and democratic
society. The ultimate success of this endeavor depends,

however, to a large extent, on Western economic and

financial support.

While foreign investors have shown interest in
Ukraine,

they have encountered significant legal, political

and economic problems that have had discouraging effects.
The major problems relating to Ukraine's investment climate
are its unstable and ineffective legal system and sluggish

economy. Although Ukraine has reached a certain success in

restructuring its legal system, national business and trade
laws are still broad, oftentimes ambiguous and subject to

arbitrary administrative interpretation. Numerous factors
have caused this condition,

such as: a desire to reach a

political compromise, decision-makers' inability or

unwillingness to understand fundamental market-based
principles, and theories that significant legislative
changes,

coupled with drastic economic reform policy, would

have negative effects.

In addition to the serious political and legal

difficulties, Ukraine also faces a great challenge in

coping with pressing economic problems. Old economic
linkages with other ex-Soviet republics dissolved upon the

break-up of the Soviet Union have not been fully restored
so far.

The Ukrainian economy has external imbalances such

as heavy debt-service schedules,

depleted foreign exchange

reserves and external payment arrears. High levels of
unemployment,

zero economic growth, and balance of payments

problems make the situation even worse. According to the

Ukrainian ministry of economics, Ukraine needs about $150200 billion in investments to complete structural reforms
of its economy.

In the past seven years it has received

only $2 billion.

Under such circumstances, Ukrainian central
authorities regard free economic zones

[thereinafter

referred to as FEZs] as vehicles that could "refresh" the
interest of foreign investors in Ukraine by offering
special tax and investment regimes. Presently, the

Ukrainian government plans to create a new agency on
special

(economic)

zones within the ministry of economics.

This new agency will perform supervisory and screening
functions, mainly via exercising environmental control over

major foreign investment projects in FEZs, supervising the

performance of obligations undertaken by foreign investors,
and examining the desirability of granting FEZ benefits and

.

advantages to foreign enterprises.^ Time will show whether
this agency will play a positive role in bringing foreign

investments to Ukrainian FEZs, or will turn out to be

another bureaucratic obstacle on the way of foreign
investors
The history of FEZs in Ukraine dates back to 1992,

when the Ukrainian Parliament adopted a law on the general

principles of the formation and operation of special

(free)

economic areas. At that time there were favorable attitudes
towards the establishment and operation of FEZs in Ukraine

which were viewed as important tools in building a free
market economy. Later, these attitudes began to erode due
to differences in positions of the central government and

local authorities.

On the one hand,

local authorities were disappointed

with the slow progress of market reforms and a deepening
economic recession and saw FEZs as a means of resolving

pressing economic and social problems of their respective
regions. Their main argument was and still remains that
FEZs would be instrumental in luring foreign investors to

their regions by offering attractive packages of tax,
fiscal and other incentives together with existing

infrastructures and production facilities.
The Ukrainian Parliament, on the other hand,

seems to

have advocated the interests of domestic enterprises and
See Irina Berezovska, Svobody ne vidat

'

[No

Liberalization is

industry who carry the brunt of the tax burden thus

replenishing Ukraine's meager coffers. The Parliament

believed that domestic enterprises would be disadvantaged
with respect to foreign transnational corporations enjoying
preferential treatment in FEZs and that the government
would unnecessarily forego much-needed revenue.
Thus,

it will be no exaggeration to state that FEZs in

Ukraine are currently in a dormant state. The Ukrainian
Parliament has passed
(economic)

a

number of laws establishing special

zones in a few localities. However, due to the

aforementioned political, economic and legislative
contradictions, the Ukrainian FEZs exist only on paper. Not
one of the established zones has generated any significant

interest among foreign investors. In part, this situation
can be explained by the absence of concrete government

policies aimed to ensure the successful operation of

Ukrainian FEZs, aggravated by disagreements between central
and local authorities concerning issues of FEZ incentives,

foreign exchange regimes, and the status of FEZs etc.

Many in Ukraine are aware that FEZs have grown rapidly
in other countries.

Developing and transitional countries

ranging from China to Poland have used free zones to
improve their business climates, develop well-functioning

regulatory frameworks suitable to accommodate the needs of
foreign investors, as well as to achieve a gamut of other

Foreseeable], Biznes, Feb. 15,

1999,

at 7.

.

economic development goals. Free zone activities are

currently so extensive that investment banks and other
private commercial bankers have rushed in to provide
capital for their development.

Successful FEZs in Ukraine may not only be

instrumental in implementing the government

'

s

economic

reforms and bringing in foreign capital and technology in
general, but will have revitalizing effects on those areas
of the country that used to be industrial centers.

In

contrast to many developing countries that used FEZs as
part of their industrialization efforts, Ukraine is already
an industrialized country with hundreds of plants and

factories which, due to an economic recession, are either

currently shut down or operating at minimal capacity owing
to the lack of financial resources,

outmoded equipment and

machinery, and inadequate access to international markets.
FEZs established in such "industrial" localities will be

able to immediately offer foreign investors existing

production facilities, a highly trained work force, basic
physical and administrative infrastructures, and transport
services etc
This paper will focus on the experience of those

developing countries whose FEZs have been regarded as
successful in attracting foreign investment and creating a
suitable environment for the activity of zone-based foreign
enterprises. Furthermore,

it will examine major aspects of

.

FEZ operations and legal and economic strategies of host

countries

Chapter

I

will conscentrate on issues relating to

foreign investment, types of attitudes towards foreign
investment and their relationship with investment policies
of host countries and the role of legal systems in

attracting foreign investment.
Chapter II will provide an overview of various types
and characteristics of FEZs, reasons for their

proliferation and some historical background. Benefits and
costs associated with the operation of FEZs will be

analyzed in this Chapter as well.
Chapter III will be devoted to the major components of
the FEZ framework,
e.g.

international economic arrangements,

tariff concessions granted by the industrialized

powers,

and the impact they have on foreign investor

behavior.

Chapter IV will examine incentives that are usually

offered by FEZs, their consequences for host countries and
value to foreign investors. This Chapter will also give a

general overview of constraints existing in foreign

investment policies of developing countries.
The conclusion will recapitulate the preceding chapters
of the paper and will outline probable future developments

with regard to FEZs in Ukraine.

.

CHAPTER

I

DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT POLICIES OF HOST
COUNTRIES
Foreign investment plays an important role in

restructuring the economies of developing and transitional
countries. These nations implement various legal and

economic reform policies to overcome sluggish economic
development, build free market economies,

increase the

contestability of domestic markets and develop social
infrastructure etc.

^

Foreign investment is regarded as an

important instrument of restructuring and modernization of
their economic systems and realization of their

industrialization and economic development agendas.^
Generally, developing and transitional countries

receiving direct foreign investment have discerned a good

opportunity to effectively implement their socio-economic
policies through obtaining much-needed capital and
technology. At the same time, governments of a good number
of these countries have been concerned by the impact

foreign investment may have on their economic, political,

^

World Investment Report 1997: Transnational
ON Trade and Dev.
Market Structure and Competition Policy at 52, TD/UNCTAD/IIT/5,
Sales No. E. 97. II. D. 10 (1997) [hereinafter World Investment Report

U.N.

CONF.

Corporations,

U.N.
1997]
^

Id.

at 96.

,

"

social and cultural development. Many countries in the

Middle East, Asia, Latin America and Africa, which require
large influxes of foreign capital and technology, have

serious reasons for fearing the concomitant consequences

caused by foreign investment. In some of these nations,

infrastructure sectors and industries manufacturing hard
consumer goods are dominated by foreign investment
result,

As a

.

their attitude towards foreign investment has been

mainly predicated on strategies to maximize positive
effects of the investment and minimize constraints and

negative consequences with respect to their national
economies

.

Types of foreign investment and peculiarities of free zone

investment

Foreign investment may take a variety of forms which

may have different implications for each recipient country.
The United Nation's World Investment Report 1997 identifies
two major types of investment:

foreign portfolio investment

and foreign direct investment. According to this document,

portfolio or private equity investment does not lead to
managerial control over foreign companies, is of a

relatively short-term nature and based essentially on
expectations of financial returns to be gained on the

Henry J.

Steiner et al.,

Transnational Legal Problems 74-84

(4th ed.

1984)

10

investment.^ Portfolio investment is nearly always in the

form of bonds, equities, bank deposits and other similar

financial claims that are freely sold or transferred.*

Antithetically, foreign direct investment presupposes

extensive managerial control and coordination with other

operations of a controlling multinational enterprise, is of
a

long-term nature and conducted with an intent to expedite

the development of a productive and effective unit in the

multinational corporation's overall activities.^
Foreign direct investment in FEZs comports with
general patterns characteristic of investment in general,
but it also has specific features representative of

investment in developing countries on the whole and in free

economic zones® in particular. One commentator

distinguishes the following forms of investment in the

developing countries: joint ventures, turnkey contracts,
licensing agreements, management contracts, franchising,

production-sharing contracts, international

See World Investment Report 1997,

"

supra note

2,

at 107.

See, e.g., S. Jane Rose, The New Wave of International Funds, 582
PLI/CoRP 123, 127-28 (1987); see also Christopher J. Mailander,
Tempering a Chill on Skittish Capital Markets: Illiquid Investments in
the Wake of Global Volatility, 13 Am. U. Int l L. Rev. 379, 391-93

*

'

(1997)
'

.

See World Investment Report 1997,

supra note

2,

at 135.

Throughout this work, the term f ree economic zones' is used as a
generic and general designation covering export free zones, export
processing zones, foreign trade zones, FEZs, free export processing
zones, free production zones, free trade zones, free zones, industrial
export processing zones, free industrial zones, mequiladora, tax free
trade zones and all other types of FEZs.
'

*

11

subcontracting.' The three most often found forms of

investment in the FEZs are foreign export -oriented

manufacturing,

foreign intra- firm assembly and

international subcontracting.^"

Enterprises with export -oriented investment are either
foreign branches or locally incorporated firms wholly owned
by

a

foreign company, usually a multinational corporation,

engaged in a full production circle, turning out goods that
are sold on foreign markets. Export -oriented enterprises

situated in FEZs make extensive use of zone-related
benefits and incentives, such as: local resources,
infrastructures, customs exemptions and low production
costs etc.^^

Another type of investment often found in FEZs is offshore manufacturing or foreign assembly. Generally,

assembly is a production-sharing arrangement between a
parent company located in an industrialized country and its

subsidiary in a developing country. The parent and
subsidiary companies are engaged in

a

series of production

processes to manufacture a final product

'

Charles Oman,

(1984)

^^
.

By their

New Forms of International Investment in Developing Countries 14-17

.

See Jose D. Amado, Free Industrial Zones: Law and Industrial
Development in the New International Division of Labour, 11 U. Pa
INT'L Bus. L. 81, 102-05 (1989).
'°

" See U.N.

J.

Export Processing Free Zones in Developing
Countries: Implications for Trade and Industrialization Policies, U.N. Doc.
TD/B/C. 2/211/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No. E. 85. II. D. 17 (1985) [hereinafter
referred to as UNCTAD EPFZs in Developing Countries]
Conf.

on Trade and Dev.

:

" See Samuel Laird,

,

.

Intra -Industry Trade and the Expansion,

.

12

nature,

FEZs are creations that effectively accommodate

off-shore production schemes through duty-free import and
export regimes, low-wage labor force, preferential tariff

arrangements with the developed countries, zone production
facilities and other incentives

^^
.

FEZs provide very

favorable conditions for foreign assembly operations. There
seems to exist a rather close relationship between offshore manufacturing and FEZs of an export processing
type

''
.

The third type is international subcontracting. Under
the international subcontracting arrangement,

contractor

-

a "principal"

frequently a TCN or a trading company

-

based

in an industrial country places orders with a sub-

contractor located in a developing country to produce
components or assemble finished products with inputs it
supplies. The final product is ordinarily marketed by the

principal contractor, both in its domestic and third-

country markets. ^^ A significant feature that distinguishes
this type of investment from foreign assembly is that under
the latter arrangement a multinational enterprise deals
Diversification and Integration of the Trade of the Developing
Countries, in International Trade
Ghosh ed. 1984)

and Third World Development 16 3,

166-67

(P.

" See generally Joseph Grunwald & Kenneth Flamm, The Global Factory: Foreign
Assembly in International Trade 1

(1985)

;

Maria Patricia Fernandez Kelly, Contemporary Production and the New
International Division of Labor, in The Americas in the New International
Division of Labor 206, 207 (S. Sanderson ed., 1985)
^*

.

See Charles Oman, supra note 9, at 17; see also Dimitri Gernidis,
International Sub -Contracting: A new Form of Investment 38-45 (1981).

^^

13

with foreign assembly enterprises that are its wholly owned
subsidiaries, whereas in a subcontracting setting the

principal contracting company concludes contracts with
independent enterprises in the developing country. It

should be also noted that subcontracting arrangements are

usually complex and contain detailed provisions spelling
out obligations of both principal contractors and their

foreign counterparts."
In the end,

mention should be made that other forms of

investment are also present in FEZs throughout the world,

reflecting policy choices of host counties as based on
various historical, political and economic factors. What
concerns Ukraine, its foreign investment law permits a wide
range of foreign investment activities subject to certain

conditions and requirements. However, it should be kept in

mind that, as each FEZ in Ukraine is created by its
national legislature via enactment of a specific law,

in

certain zones some forms of investment may arguably be

granted more preferential treatment over that provided by
the general foreign investment law.

Diversity of host country attitudes and their relationship
with investment policies

Attitudes of host governments toward foreign
investment differ from country to country, ranging from
See Jose D. Amado,

supra note 10, at 103-04

14

"open door" policies,

for instance in China,

to restrictive

investment practices, e.g. in Japan. Usually, these

attitudes reflect different economic policy goals,
investment controls and foreign exchange regimes etc. Such

differences in attitude may be accounted for by numerous
social, political,

economic and cultural

f actors

^^
.

Therefore, several components of a host country's foreign

investment policy have to be analyzed in order to define
its general attitude towards foreign investment.

There is a direct relationship between socio-economic
goals such as attraction of foreign capital and technology,

expansion of export production, generation of employment,
national controls of allocation of natural and human

resources etc. and approaches used to ensure their

achievement

.

These approaches include both direct control

of foreign investment by host countries'

authorities, as

well as a wide range of investment-related constraints and

incentives

^^
.

The host country may exercise control in a

variety of ways, from participation in decisions concerning
foreign investment to authorization of competent
authorities'

intervention with respect to contracts dealing

See generally Howard B. Berke, Host Countries' Attitudes Toward
Foreign Investment, 3 Brooklyn J. Int'lL. 233, 234-44 (1977).
^'

" Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt them: Explaining
the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 Va. J. Int l L.
639, 660-62 (1998)
'

.

:
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with industrial co-operation, turnkey projects, acquisition
of patents,

trademarks and know-how etc /^

In their study on investments in export processing

zones, Antonie Basile and Dimitri Germidis have defined

five types of attitudes to foreign investment in recipient

countries
The first type includes attitudes that are reflected
in policies of those countries that are widely open to

foreign capital, while retaining a certain level of

regulation of foreign investment. Even those countries that
have highly liberal investment regimes make certain

reservations with respect to exclusive investment by their
nationals in specifically defined industries. Instead of

making such reservations, some countries are willing to
establish certain levels limiting the extent to which
foreign participation in enterprises or industries is
permissive. Although the protected sectors and enterprises

vary from country to country, most strict control usually
exists in industries considered important for national

security reasons, e.g. defense industries, energy, natural
resources, transport and telecommunications etc.

Furthermore, countries of this group are known to afford

high levels of protection, via tariff and non-tariff

^'

Antonie Basile & Dimitri Germidis,

(1984)

.

Investing In Free Export Processing Zones 15

.
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barriers or prohibitory measures, to particular domestic
activities

.^°

Counties of the second type of attitude have less
liberal foreign investment policies than those of the first
type nations. They impose a number of requirements

respecting foreign investment, such as due declaration and

registration of direct foreign investment

.^^

Investment

incentive programs in these countries are conceived and

implemented in such a manner that direct investments and

technology maximally realize national goals. The
nomenclature of industries and sectors that are available
for direct foreign investment varies from country to

country. Generally,

these countries place greater emphasis

on incentives to attract direct foreign investment than on

restrictions
Countries of the third type are more restrictive in
their foreign investment regimes and have special

procedures for evaluation of foreign investment and

technology before acceptance. Foreign investment policies
of these countries,

albeit containing incentives to attract

much needed investments, tend to be more focused on
restrictions. Depending on their policy prerogatives,

countries of the third group use different criteria for

*°

Lebanon serves as an example of this type of attitude.

Venezuela demands that foreign investments be accompanied by
technology transfer contracts. See Antonie Basile & Dimitri Germidis, supra
note 19, at 15.
'^

17

evaluation of foreign investment

^^
.

Generally, these

countries prefer establishment of joint ventures. In the
area of technology transfers, some nations, e.g. Mexico,
impose numerous restrictions and exert tight controls over

payments of royalties and fees. The incentives offered are

usually linked to performance levels with regard to
exports,

location, employment, participation rates and

value added.

Countries that fall under the fourth type allow direct
foreign investment only upon conclusion of agreements

setting forth precise conditions investors are to perform.
Some countries, e.g. the Philippines and Sri Lanka, use

qualitative criteria, pursuant to which the mandatory rules

governing foreign investor conduct are defined. These
criteria, which vary from country to country depending on

industries concerned and levels of priority granted to
investments, put particular emphasis on binding rates of
local participation, management control, or the

repatriation of profits, royalties and other payments. Some
countries of this group may prescribe certain time limits

beyond which foreign investors are required to surrender
their interests in enterprises. Indonesia and Peru serve as

good illustrations of this approach. Investment regimes are

results-based and incentives will frequently be continued
Egypt, for instance, examines the effect foreign investment may have
on its exchange reserves, while South Korea is known to attache great
importance to non-competition of foreign investment projects with
local firms. See Antonie Basile & Dimitri Germidis, supra note 19, at 15.
^^

.
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or withheld as based on determinations whether positive or

negative results have been achieved.
The fifth type includes countries which allow direct

foreign investment only in joint venture form. Contractual
joint ventures are created for purposes of realizing

particular goals within defined time limits. Foreign
investment has to comply precisely with objectives set out
in national economic programs and be in strict compliance

with existing laws.^^
The characteristics of the Ukrainian foreign

investment regime indicate that the attitude to foreign
investment in this country falls generally under the second
type. The Ukrainian foreign investment law has provisions

containing guarantees against expropriation of foreign
investors' property,

impediment in the repatriation of

profits and other important safeguards. At the same time,
however,

foreign investors are subject to certain

requirements concerning declaration and registration of
their investments.^" Furthermore,

investments in

enterprises undergoing privatization should comply with an
extra set of requirements established by Ukrainian

privatization laws. Besides, Ukraine has a number of

'^

Id.

at 16.

The Law of Ukraine on the Regime of Foreign Investment Activity,
Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady 1996, #93/96-VR, p. 80; enacted under
Resolution #94/96-VR of the Verkhovnoyi Rady of Ukraine on 03.19.96
(WR #19 '1996, p 81) [hereinafter referred to as the foreign
investment law]
^''

19

industries and enterprises with restricted or closed access
for foreign investment, e.g. defense industries, areas of

energy, natural resources,

transport and some others. The

list of such industries and enterprises is determined

pursuant to the Ukrainian law on entrepreneurship " It is
.

prepared by the central government and approved by the
Ukrainian parliament.

Role of legal systems in attracting foreign investment

A developing or transitional country facing

a

challenge

to lure foreign investment and ensure effective ways of its

utilization must develop and implement complex legal
reforms to modernize its legal system. ^^ Therefore, there

may be adverse effects on policies and incentive measures
put in place to attract foreign investors if three

important components of the legal system are distorted:
factor prices, transaction costs and types and amounts of
risks that foreign investors have to bear. Thus,

it stands

for the proposition that legal systems that increase factor

prices, give rise to unreasonably high transaction costs or

force foreign investors to bear excessive amounts of risk

have a "freezing" effect on direct foreign investment. For
example, governments of many Central and Eastern European
" The Law of Ukraine on Entrepreneurship, Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady
1991, # 14, p. 168; enacted under Resolution #785-12 of the
Verkhovnoyi Rady of Ukraine on 02.26.91.
" William
World,

M.

Stelwagon, Financing Private Energy Projects in the Third
Law. 45, 60-61 (1996)

37 Cath.

.
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countries have recognized the fact that inadequate legal
regimes can discourage flows of foreign investment and

adversely affect investor behavior.

^'^

Conceivably, legal reform has been viewed as one of
the most important factors of attracting foreign investment

by the CEE countries. They have enacted new foreign

investment laws establishing adequate regulatory frameworks
in order to facilitate both foreign direct and portfolio

investment.

It should be noted that

generally the foreign

investment laws have brought positive results in these
countries. In addition,

legislation governing areas closely

related to investment activities, such as corporate law,
taxation, property, bankruptcy and securities etc., has

been enacted and effectively implemented by the CEE

See Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of
Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern
Europe, 1 Colum. J. Transnat l L. 1, 11-13 (1995) (factor prices are
prices of capital, labor, or technology and can be positively or
negatively influenced by background rules established in the legal
system. For example, real costs of labor to a foreign investor in a
country in which the hourly wage rate is relatively low may in fact be
considerably higher because of legal rules that place limits on the
employer's ability to hire or dismiss workers or rules that require
significant tax contributions to social welfare programs. Transaction
costs are costs that arise when individuals exchange ownership rights
to economic assets and enforce their exclusive rights. Legal regimes
also raise or lower the costs of foreign investment by determining the
types and degree of risk that the foreign investor must bear.
Commercial law in the developed economies has created a variety of
institutional structures that try to allocate risk. Many branches of
the law are relevant to an allocation of risk, such as contract law,
the law of secured transactions, ant i- trust, bankruptcy law and tort
^^

'

law)

.
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countries in an effort to improve their national legal
systems. ^^
In contrast to the CEE countries,

Ukraine,

like many-

other CIS nations, has internal legal problems, which have

discouraging effects on foreign investors. In Ukraine,
certain areas of substantive commercial law, e.g.
intellectual property and contracts, are regulated by

heavily amended Soviet laws and codes. In the area of
foreign investment, Ukrainian national laws and regulations
that have been enacted after the declaration of

independence establish a rather favorable foreign
investment regime. However, the amended laws and codes,

especially the Civil Code and some intellectual property
laws,

have failed to eliminate the major legal, economic

and institutional obstacles to stimulate domestic and

foreign investment. A vast body of Ukrainian law inherited
from the Soviet Union needs to be replaced with modern

statutes adapted to the country's present-day needs. ^'
Unless new market-based commercial legislation designed to

accommodate the needs of a market economy is enacted,
incessant breaches of contractual obligations, undeveloped

commercial and insurance systems, lack of adequate
intellectual property protections, loopholes in land law.
''

Id.

See e.g. Jenik Radon, Permitted Unless Prohibited: The Changed
Soviet Mentality, 20 Fordham Int'l L.J. 365, 368-369 (1996); see also
Roger Alan Boner & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy in Ukraine, 31
Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 1, 28-29 (1997)
^'

.
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burdensome taxation, ineffective and slow judicial and
enforcement mechanisms^" and high levels of corruption will
create pestering problems keeping foreign investors away
from Ukraine. Besides, economic instability, a significant

trade deficit, political vicissitudes, sky-high costs of

doing business have significantly contributed to

deterioration of Ukraine's business climate in general and
lack of interest on the side of foreign investors in

Ukrainian FEZs in particular.

Daniel A. Bilak, Prometheus Unbound or Achilles' Heel?:
Implications of Emerging Legal Structures in Ukraine for Foreign
Investment, 654 PLI/Comm 459, 465 (1993)

^°

See,

e.g.,

.

CHAPTER II
FEZS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE WITHIN HOST COUNTRIES' ECONOMIC

DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS
There are numerous reasons and policy considerations

underpinning countries' decisions to create FEZs.^^ The
FEZs are established on the basis of the presumption that

benefits associated with their creation will surpass any
potential costs. It is believed that in the long run these
creations will bring about favorable economic,

technological and social results in the host countries. The
fact that the FEZs exist both in industrialized and

developing countries demonstrates their great potential and
flexibility. Conceivably, countries design their FEZ

policies to ensure attainment of various goals such as:
liberal management of foreign trade, attraction of foreign
investment, exploitation of natural resources,

revitalization of economically backward localities,

generation of employment, elimination of economic costs,
attainment of export -promotion goals, generation of foreign
exchange, modernization of highly restrictive tariff,

" Steven

M.

Rubin,

Tax-Free Exporting Zones 1-3

23

(1988)

tax

.
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and commercial systems for domestic protection purposes
etc

By establishing FEZs on their territories,

industrialized countries, such as the USA and Canada, place
greater emphasis on economic revitalization of

underdeveloped areas, development of social infrastructure
and generation of employment for local population."
In contrast,

developing and transitional countries

expect more from the FEZs in terms of obtaining of foreign

capital and technology, attainment of export-oriented
goals,

improvement of the balance of payment situation etc.

In short,

the developing countries regard FEZs as an

industrialization instrument that will promote their
general social, economic and political development.^"

From the international trade law perspective, FEZs
represent the convergence of two trends in the

international division of labor. The first trend relates

primarily to those countries that have the experience of
unsuccessful import substitution attempts and now wish to
pursue export -oriented policies. They recognize the

creation of FEZs as a necessary step on the way to their
economic growth through stimulation of exports of zone
" See generally Richard
North/South America (1992)
Europe (1993)

L.
;

Bolin,

The New zones:

East/West Europe and

see also Richard L. Bolin,

Free zones in the New

.

" See generally Herbert Grubel, supra note 66; see also Ellen
Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1341 (1993).
^*

See Jose D. Amado,

supra note 10.

P.

Aprill,

.
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manufactured products." Furthermore, the success that was
achieved by the Newly Industrialized countries of SouthEast Asia through implementation of their open market

policies has stimulated developing countries to change
their economic policies from import-substitution to exportled trade approaches and offer various vital facilities,

including FEZs.^^
The second trend concerns multinational corporations
in western industrialized nations.

They have quickly

assessed new opportunities created by FEZs and transferred
surplus capital to these low cost production localities in
the developing countries.

^^

The main thrust of TCN

strategies is to achieve cost minimization effects. Through
such strategies, multinational enterprises intend to

resolve some structural problems and remove growing

competitive pressure, or seek to preserve or even increase
their competitive potential. In this, the corporations are

bound to relocate some of their manufacturing facilities in
FEZs with an intention to re-export zone-manufactured

products either to their national or third country
markets

^®
.

" See Antonie Basile

& Dimitri Germidis,

supra note 19, at 19-21.

" See Walter H. Diamond, Offshore Trading and Financial Services in
Eastern Europe (visited Apr. 20, 1998)
<http //www. oceanalaw. com/resources /diamond. htm>
:

^''

Kofi 0. Kufour,

(1997)
^*

The Ghana Free Zone Act,

10 Transnat l Law,
'

.

See Antonie Basile

& Dimitri Germidis,

supra note 19, at 20-21.
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Proliferation and historic background of FEZs
The number of FEZs around the world have promptly

increased in the past ten years, but this recent expansion
was preceded by a few decades of sluggish development.

Successful zones in Latin America and South-East Asia have

significantly strengthened confidence in the practicality
and effectiveness of FEZs as an institution capable of

achieving host countries' socio-economic goals. ^' In zones
that have delivered comprehensively liberalized policies,

multinational corporations have created millions of jobs in
areas of zone-based assembly and manufacturing, banking and
insurance,

storage and transshipment, distribution and

labor-intensive processing.^"
There are various reasons to explain such rapid

proliferation of FEZs. First, industrial enterprises in the
developed nations are becoming less profitable which is
due,

among other things, to high wage costs and

environmental protection measures. Second, by virtue of
technological progress there have developed production
methods enabling to divide complex manufacturing processes
into structural components which can be performed by

workers who are comparatively unskilled or need only a
little amount of on-job training. Third, achievements in
" See Michael J. Tucker, Foreign Trade Zones in Latin America: A
Spectrum of Possible Uses, 23 Tex. Int l L. J. 177, 119-20 (1988)
'

*°

See generally R. Bolin, The Global Network

.

of Export Processing Zones

(1989)
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the areas of transportation

(airfreight, containers),

telecommunications, computerized information technology
etc.

have rendered industrial location considerations and

production controls less dependent on geographical
distance /^
Historically,

free ports were the first type of FEZ.

They were mainly engaged in a limited range of commercial
activities such as transshipment, warehousing, packaging
and re-export of goods. Complex customs procedures that

usually hindered flows of goods were simplified in the free
ports

."^

After the end of World War II free zones underwent
further development and acquired new characteristics. As a
result,

there began to appear production-oriented zones.

This type of zones developed essentially due to efforts

undertaken by developing countries to lure foreign capital
and encourage production of goods for exports.*^ The first

export processing zone was created at Shannon airport in

Ireland in 1959 at the time when this country's

industrialization policy underwent a change from import
substitution to export-led expansion. This zone was
successful and triggered further development of Ireland's

export-based industrial sector throughout the 1960s.
" See Antonie Basile & Dimitri Germidis,

" See Richard
(1956)
*^

S.

Thoman,

supra note 19, at 21.

Free Ports and Foreign- Trade Zones 6-9,

15-19

.

See UNCTAD: EPFZs

in Developing Countries,

supra note 11, at 1-2.

.
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Establishment of the Shannon EPZ in Ireland marked a new
phase in the evolution of FEZs

.

In the mid 1960s and early

1970s Korea and Taiwan that were undergoing rapid

industrialization created their export processing zones.
China established special economic zones in the late 1970s
and early 1980s as part of its "Open Door" policy in an

effort to reform the Chinese socialist economy.

"**

In the

late 1980s and early 1990s, when the "Iron Curtain" began
to crumble,

socialist nations in Central and Eastern Europe

and ex-Soviet republics opened up their economies and

established FEZs as well."^
Ukraine adopted a law on the general principles of the
formation and operation of special
1992.

(free)

economic areas in

This law sets forth general principles of

establishment and functioning of Ukrainian

FEZs.'*^

To date,

there has been adopted special legislation creating a

number of FEZs in Ukraine.

It should be noted,

however,

that all of these zones remain for the most part to exist

only on paper and have not been really functioning.

" Xiangming Chen, The Evolution of FEZs and the Recent Development of
Cross National Growth Zones, 19 INT L J. URBAN & REGIONAL RESEARCH
'

593,

595.

See Sergei A. Manezhev, FEZs and the Economic Transition in the
Chinese People's Republic and Russia, 31 Russ & E. Eur. Fin. & Trade
76, 76-77 (1995)

*^

.

.

The Law of Ukraine on the General Principles of the
Formation and Operation of Special (Free) Economic Areas,
Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady, 1992, #50, p. 679; enacted under
Resolution #2674-12 of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, of
10.13.92, WR, 1992, #50, p. 677 [hereinafter referred to as
the Ukrainian FEZ law]
"**

29

However,

legislative, political and economic efforts are

made to breathe new life into these projects."^ The

experience of foreign countries in the area of FEZs is
studied and prospects of successful development of

Ukrainian FEZs are evaluated from different perspectives.
In this regard,

China's experience in the

establishment of special economic zones is valuable for
Ukraine. China has successfully realized a comprehensive

economic reform of its socialist economy that was initiated
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. With respect to Ukraine,

Chinese expertise is especially to the point because the

Ukrainian economy is still in the state of transition from
a

command to a market -based economy, with many vestiges of

the ex-Soviet economic system. ^^

Special economic zones were part of "Open Door"

policies adopted by China in the early 1980s. Among other
things,

the zones were conceived as laboratories to test

new legislative initiatives and different market economy

methods that could be later adapted and introduced into
China's economy. The SEZs were also expected to function as

export-oriented areas that would attain foreign exchange
and advanced technology

To achieve the goals of

^^
.

diversification of the management and production systems.
See e.g. Fyodor I. Kushnirsky, Post-Soviet Attempts to Establish
Free Economic Zones, 38 Post-Soviet Geography & Econ. 144, 156-57 (1997)

"^

"^

Roger Alan Boner

31 GW J.

INT'L L.

&

William

& Econ.

1,

3

E.

.

Kovacic, Antitrust Policy in Ukraine,

(1997)

.
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the zone authorities were granted exceptional powers and

privileges, such as a direct line of communications with
the central government, which allowed to address their

special needs and deal with problems without delay.

^°

The Chinese central government efficiently met the

needs posed by rapid modernization via an imposing array of

economic reforms and re-organizations. The SEZs found their
special place within these economic modernization efforts.

China

'

experimental program aimed at developing and

s

implementing new strategies for economic growth included
the continued development of the SEZs. The demonstration

effect of these zones upon the rest of China was considered
an important element in its economic growth strategies. For

example,

wholly

at the outset of the economic reforms,

foreign-owned enterprises were permitted to operate only
within the SEZs. After effects of the foreign enterprises'

activity had been tested in the zones, this type of
investment was permitted in other coastal cities.

Management reforms, including bonus system reform and

permission of more flexible hiring and firing practices,
were first conducted at the SEZs as well."

"'

Y.

C.

Jao & C.

" See Michael
''

Id.

K.

Oborne,

Leung,

China's Special Economic Zones 124-27

China's Special Economic Zones 9-10

(1986)

.

(1986)

.
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Definition of FEZs

Although there exist numerous definitions of FEZs,
they basically define a FEZ as an administratively and

sometimes geographically delimited area, which enjoys
special status and where certain types of economic activity
are conducted without most of government taxation and

regulation that otherwise would apply to the rest of the
country. Special status generally involves a favorable
legal regulatory framework,

low cost facilities and

infrastructure and incentive systems consisting of tax,
customs,

financial and other benefits.^^

Another definition is that the FEZ is a specialized
industrial location situated physically and/or

administratively outside a host country's customs
boundaries and intended to produce exports; facilities of
such zones, usually complemented by other incentives,

serve

both to lure foreign investors and conveniently accommodate
their start-up needs."

Common to virtually all the definitions are the
following attributes. First, free zones are located in

geographically defined localities, within determined
boundaries. Second, market forces rather than governmental

agencies allocate resources and set prices. Economic

activity in the FEZs is also regulated through market-based
" See Kofi O. Kufour,

" See Antonie Basile

supra note 37.

& Dimitri Germidis,

supra note 19, at 20-21.
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approaches, with special emphasis on such economic factors
as prices,

labor and operating costs, profits, taxes,

exchange and interest rates.
Further,

^*

foreign capital is the major source of funds

for establishing and developing a FEZ. The contribution the

zone is likely to make to the national economy is

determined mainly by its success in attracting foreign
capital,

technology and management skills. In addition,

zone-manufactured products are intended primarily for
export purposes. The success of a free zone depends, to a
large extent, on how well its products sell on

international markets and the ability of the host

government to determine as precisely as possible material
conditions that will ensure the effective functioning of
the zone."

Major types and characteristics of FEZs

Although one of the advantages of FEZs is

a

relevantly

insignificant level of government regulation and control of
FEZ economic participants and activitie's,

FEZs are not

entirely autonomous from government influence due to the
existence of some form and degree of administrative
governance. There are identified three characteristic

^*

See Kofi 0. Kufour,

" See ANTONiE Basile

supra note 37.

& DiMiTRi Germidis,

supra note 19, at 11-12
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models of free zone governance: the organizational model;
the administrative model; and the integrated model."
In a FEZ based on the principles of the organizational

model, non-profit private, public, or joint private-public

entities are charged with authority to provide the

necessary infrastructure, coordinate economic activities
and furnish essential logistic services. For example,

the

Jakarta EPZ in Indonesia, the Colon FTZ in Panama, the

Hanko free port in Finland and some FTZs and EPZs in
Ireland and Malaysia represent the organizational model.

^^

The administrative model presupposes that management
of a FEZ is delegated by a higher-level authority to a

local governmental agency which supervises and regulates
the zone's economic,

commercial and industrial affairs, or

is performed by local port and customs authorities

directly. Zones representative of the administrative model

operate in Brazil
EPZ)

(the Manaus SEZ)

and the SEZs in China

^®
.

,

South Korea (the Masan

Ukrainian FEZ legislation

provides for establishment of FEZs with characteristics

corresponding to the administrative model. ^^
The third model integrates the features of the first
two models. Under this integrated model arrangement,

the

" See Xiangming Chen, supra note 44, at 595
''

Id.

58

Id.

" See, e.g., Article 5, the Law of Ukraine on Special Economic Zones
and the Special Regime of Investment Activity in the Donetsk Province,
Vidomosti Verkhovnoyi Rady 1999, #7, p. 50.
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local government may subcontract coordination and

management of the zone's affairs to a private firm. A few
FTZs in Germany exemplify this FEZ model. A recent variant
of the integrated model is the emergence of parastatal

business agencies that centralize and administer all
functions of directing the business of a FEZ. A good

example of this modern development is the Export Processing
Zone Development Authority of -Mauritius.

Although the three models of FEZ governance have
structural differences, they all are structured to provide
the so-called "one-stop'

or "one-window shopping', e.g.

procedures under which foreign and domestic investment
projects are approved locally and promptly without

engagement of authorities on national, regional or
provincial levels. Each of these governance structures
presents a rational approach to promoting private economic

activities without exacting macro-management

^°
.

Another classification of FEZs is based on what types
of entities are authorized to discharge zone affairs. Under

this classification,

there are distinguished two types of

FEZs: public and private. As has been noted,

free zones are

generally planned and established in pursuit of objectives
of attracting foreign investment and technology,

creating

jobs and ensuring a general positive influence on the

economy of a particular region or country. Because of the

See Xiangming Chen,

supra note 44, at 595

.
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broad impact of these and similar goals on the country as a
whole,

their achievement is the primary responsibility of

government rather than private entities. FEZs administered
by governmental agencies are considered to be public and
are known to have produced numerous positive effects on

local economies of host countries. Through public free
zones the governments endeavor to expand their countries'

economic power to achieve wider social benefits

-

a goal

which is of little interest for private free zones which
are based on profit maximization principles.

Free zones run by private entities are regarded as

private. Arguably, a public free zone provides equal

opportunities to any company that is interested in
investing in it, while private zones can pick and choose
clients. Consequently, public zones are willing to increase

possibilities for small-size companies that want to invest
in circumstances where social benefits would not be

considered by the management of private free zones."
In Ukraine,

types of FEZs are defined on the basis of

their functional characteristics. The Decree of the Cabinet
of Ministers of Ukraine" enacted in implementation of the

Ukrainian FEZ law defines the following types of FEZs:

The Case For Public Free Zones, in Public vs.
Bolin ed., 1993) (public zones like those in
Taiwan, Korea have been dynamic instruments for their countries. For
instance Kaohsiung, Taiwan is one of the most important EPZs in the
world and Masan, in South Korea too)
^^

Juan Torrens Tolosa,

Private Free Zones 3,

3-4

(R.

" The Central Government of Ukraine.

.
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Trade zones. Zones of this type may take a variety of
forms such as porto franco, custom- free zones and trade

warehouses. Basically, the major functions of a trade zone
are to store, process,

repackage, or market foreign-made

goods without payment of duties and customs fees."

Industrial production zones. Usually, export -oriented

processing operations are supposed to be carried out in
these zones, but the Ukrainian central government did not

exclude a possibility of establishing zones of an import-

processing nature in Ukraine. Under the Decree, zones of
this type will offer special tax, currency and custom-

regime incentives to increase production, bring in advanced

technology and generate employment

Research and development zones. These zones are to be
established in special areas designated as technological
parks,

research and development parks and innovation

centers. The purpose behind the establishment of this type
of zones in Ukraine is to create new technology and promote

technologically advanced industries, stimulate the
development of fundamental and applied sciences and the
conduct of

RScD

activities.*"

Tourism and recreation zones. Tourism and recreation
zones may be created in the Black Sea, Azov Sea and other

5ee Fyodor

" Id.

I.

Kushnirsky,

supra note 47, at 151-52
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resort areas, regions rich in wholesome mineral water

resources and localities famous for their long-standing

traditions and historic places of interest.

Banking and insurance (offshore) zones. Such zones can
be established for purposes of servicing non-resident

status customers both within and outside Ukraine. Foreign

financial institutions authorized to operate within zones
of this type will be granted non-resident status. Under

zone currency regimes all transactions in banking and

insurance

currencies

(offshore)

zones zones may be done in foreign

^^
.

According to Ukrainian law, regional and local
authorities ought to act as initiators to create FEZs

within their respective territorial units. They have to
submit to the Ukrainian Parliament requests,

including

substantiated plans for the creation of FEZs, the type of
the proposed zones,

the intended scope of their economic

activity, projected exemptions and incentives etc. Upon

consideration and approval, the Parliament enacts a law

pronouncing the establishment of a FEZ and delineating its
functions and scope of commercial activities, as well as
the range of permissive benefits and exemptions.

Id.

at 152
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Benefits and costs

Establishment and functioning of FEZs, if successful,
will supposedly bring a variety of economic, political and
social benefits.

In FEZs economic activities subject to a

lower degree of costly impediments of government control,

regulation and taxation will supposedly expand more

promptly and such expansion will have favorable employment,

productivity and balance of payments implications." Most
common benefits associated with FEZs is that they foster
exports,

attract foreign capital and advanced technology,

stimulate domestic markets, raise productivity, provide new

employment opportunities, procure higher levels of
technical skills and management, develop national economies

through the demonstration effect, achieve various regional
goals etc."
Generally, businesses in FEZs are likely to enjoy

advantages of lower production and operating costs and

greater flexibility in employment contracts. This, together
with other factors, may afford the necessary impetus for
setting up production facilities and generating services
and products that otherwise would not be available. The

subsequent enhanced economic level of output and

productivity constitutes trade expansion that is

" Herbert
*''

Grubel,

Free Market Zones 2-4

Eduardo Arango Pineres,

(1983)

.

World Industry and Export Processing Zones,
9, 10 (R. Bolin ed. ,1989)

in The Global Network of Export Processing Zones

.
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advantageous for people living in the countries hosting the
free zones/®

Debt servicing and generation of foreign currency are

also among the oft-cited positive effects of operation of
FEZs in the developing countries.

In the 1990 's,

debt

servicing placed a heavy burden on developing and many
former Soviet block countries, leading to balance of

payments difficulties. In fact, export -promotion policies
of some countries were developed not as part of

industrialization efforts, but as a major effort to resolve
their foreign exchange and debt servicing problems.

Successful FEZs are known to generate significant
amounts of foreign exchange and it is not surprising that
some developing countries have created them as a measure to

decrease the deficit in their balances of payments."
Exports emanating from FEZs account for substantial foreign

exchange earnings. Statistical data show that they

constitute 20% or more of manufacturing exports in such
countries as Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, the Philippines,
Singapore, Taiwan and Tunisia. One of the major benefits
host countries obtain from FEZs is the net foreign exchange

influx procured in the form of export proceeds and

investment capital.^"

" See Herbert

Grubel,

^'

See UNCTAD: EPFZS

^°

See Jose D. Amado,

supra note 66, at 81.
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,

supra note 11, at

supra note 10, at 113-14.
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However, one reservation should be made in this
respect. As is generally known, FEZs provide free access to

imports so that imported inputs used in zone production is
a characteristic feature.

This,

in its turn,

leads to a

large discrepancy between gross foreign exchange generation

and net foreign currency earnings. Many developing

countries understand that the real effect on their balance
of payments standing equals to the amount of local value

added to zone-manufactured products which,

in addition to

initial capital investments by investors, will make up net

foreign currency earnings. In this regard,

India is a good

illustration as it prescribed that firms who want to start

operation in its FEZs add a minimum of 30% of local content
to the goods produced.

Similarly, high percentages of local

inputs were achieved by other FEZs,

including those

situated in Korea (52%) and Taiwan (46%).

'^^

Free zones can also be used as a laboratory for

experimenting with free market policies, which is another
benefit associated with their establishment. Experience has
shown that FEZs have significant demonstration effects

achieved through the visibility of the zones, especially in

developing countries. As a result of its originality,
economic activity in a zone is observed very closely by the
local community and industries. Such observation normally

ECON. & SOC. COMM'N FOR ASIA & THE PACIFIC/U.N. CENTRE FOR TRANSNAT'L
Joint Unit on Transnational Corporations, An Evaluation of Export Processing
Zones in Selected Asian Countries at 146, U.N. Doc. ST/ESCAP/395 (1985)

'^

U.N.

Corp.

.

.
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engenders learning effects outside the zone, particularly
in management techniques,

marketing.
countries'

organization of work or export

Close physical and social contacts that host

^^

firms develop with zone-based foreign

enterprises enable the former to more effectively acquire
and use foreign technological and managerial expertise.

^^

FEZs also play an important role in the evolution of
the new international division' of labor,

in which certain

industries, mostly those that require labor-intensive work,
are transferred from the industrialized countries to the

developing nations. This is achieved either via subjoint venture arrangements or establishment of

contracting,

local branches of foreign enterprises.^" There are positive

effects because international production increases

employment opportunities and foreign exchange earnings in
the developing countries.

^^

Although host countries obtain many benefits from the
operation of free zones on their territory, the concept of
the FEZs has also drawn much criticism. The main argument

advanced by zone critics is that FEZs do no make any really
valuable contribution to the developing countries because

^^

See Kofi O. Kufour,

supra note 37.

''^

United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,
Central and Eastern Europe 1 (1991)

The Challenge of FEZs in

.

'"*

See Charles

0^4AN,

'^

supra note

9,

at 17.

See U.N. Gone on Trade and Dev., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 19 94 at 210,
U.N. Sales No. E. 94. A. 14 (1994) [hereinafter referred to as WORLD
INVESTMENT REPORT 1994]
.

.
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they fall short of transforming the asymmetric character of
the "North-South" economic relationship. Arguably,

the FEZs

only duplicate trade patterns in relationships between

developing and developed countries on a smaller scale. ^^
It is argued that enterprises in most of the free

zones employ low- skilled workers and consequently do not

generate any needs for the development of a highly trained
local labor force. Therefore,

there is no actual transfer

of skills and technical knowledge to local workers employed
in the free zone.

Further, being unskilled,

the majority of

workers in FEZs have usually minimal prospects for
promotion.

In this respect it should be also mentioned

^^

that those people who have undergone training overseas have
a

tendency to move from one place to another for better

prospects. This tendensy has an adverse impact on the

investing firms. For example, it occurs in Singapore,

Taiwan and Korea, where labor conditions have steadily

altered in recent years under export-led industrialization
strategies

^^
.

Another avenue of criticism is based on contentions
that the FEZs often fail to generate anticipated types of
jobs and insure any long-term sustainability of such

employment. A lot of free zones concentrate their

''^

"
'''

See Kofi O. Kufour,

supra note 37.

Id.

F.A. Rabbani,
49 (1983)

Economic and Social Impacts Of Export Processing Zones In Asia 48-
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production activity in textile and electronics industries.
This means that even advantages of low-wage labor

multiplied by other incentives may not be enough for
certain host countries to create a steady source of
employment in their FEZs.^^
Tax incentives in FEZs have also caused much
controversy.

It remains

unclear whether tax incentives have

any real influence in motivating foreign firms to relocate

their activities into free zones. Critics argue that

revenues forgone in result of tax benefits and various
costs incurred in establishing the FEZs could place an

unnecessary burden on taxpayers, especially in the
developing countries. Surveys of the functioning free zones
around the world, including US enterprise zones, suggest
that often tax incentives there are not so efficient as to

produce benefits proportionate with the costs incurred.
Being special tax breaks designed to induce particular
behavior,

tax incentives are prone to reduce tax revenues.

Such lost revenues represent a cost to the host countries.
Therefore, they need to appraise FEZs by viewing revenue

foregone due to the existence of zone tax incentives as a

transfer of funds from the central governments to companies

operating in the zones. ®°

"'

See WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1994,

'°

See Ellen P. Aprill,
1346 (1993)

1341,

.

supra note 75, at 210.

Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66

S.

Cal.

L.

Rev.

44

Issues of technology transfers in FEZs have not

escaped criticism either. Arguably, technology that is

transferred into a FEZ is mainly limited to technically

unsophisticated and repeated operations and processes
involving labor intensive input on assembly and product
lines.

some Asian countries do not possess the

For example,

knowledge necessary to make quality products for export and
therefore they are dependent on technical assistance from
foreign firms to turn out products competitive in quality
in international markets.

Frequently, this is achieved via

joint venture arrangements rather than licensing

agreements

^^
.

This type of situation,

free zone critics contend,

increases host countries' dependence on foreign technology.
Moreover,

this assertion is confirmed by the fact that

foreign firms operating in the FEZs do not hurry to move
their research and development facilities to the host
country. There are various reasons to explain why this is

happening, one of them is that foreign firms usually have
no incentive to transfer modern technology and R&D

operations for fear that it may eliminate their competitive
edge on local firms.

®^

Presumably, one of the major reasons why countries set
up FEZs is to ensure foreign exchange earnings and resolve

'^

*^

See F.A. Rabbani

,

supra note 78, at 48-49,

See Kofi O. Kufour,

supra note 37.
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balance -of -payment problems. It is argued that quite often
FEZs are responsible for outflows of capital from host

countries to foreign investors' states of origin. In this
respect,

the FEZs are used only in the interests of

international capital and as a result fall short of

advancing actual national development goals. ®^
Apparently, FEZs are not devoid of drawbacks which may

negate any positive effects associated with their
operation. Hence,

it stands for the

proposition that a host

country should put in place specific FEZ policies that
would maximize benefits of FEZs and minimize costs and
other related negative consequences.

Free economic zone legislation
As noted above,

a

country's legal system is

instrumental in ensuring the efficiency of its foreign
investment policies which have a direct relation to the
success of FEZs. A good deal of the free zone's ability to

operate properly depends on the adequacy of and optimal

relationship between national and local law so that foreign
investors' needs are efficiently accommodated, while

assuring that the host country's interests and policies are
not going to be impaired.^''

" See George
(1990)

T.

Crane,

The Political Economy of China's Special Economic Zones 11

.

" See Y.

C.

Jao & C.

K.

Leung,

supra note 49, at 125-27.

1
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Presently, Ukraine does not have effective legislation

regulating issues of local self-government which results in
that that central,

regional and local authorities

oftentimes enact conflicting legislation which hinders
economic activity, erects additional bureaucratic obstacles
and frustrates plans of foreign investors. Besides, Ukraine
has not fully resolved issues of local autonomy in certain

legislative and administrative matters. Regional and local

authorities frequently lack the mandate to legislate in the
areas of commercial activity and foreign investment to

create a business environment and regulatory framework that
best suit local business needs.

In this regard,

China's

experience in developing its legal system and resolving
issues relating to the activity of legislative bodies of

various levels is quite useful for Ukraine.
The Chinese present legal system has developed over
the past twenty years. Lawmaking bodies of various levels

have passed laws and regulations that have been generally

drawn from Western legal models.®^
Local legislation had played an important role in

attracting foreign direct investment in China long before
it adopted the Provisions for the Encouragement of Foreign

" See, e.g., Peter Howard Corne, Lateral Movements: Legal Flexibility
and Foreign Investment Regulation in China, 27 Case W. Res. J. Int
'

L.

247

(1995)

.
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(also known as 22 Articles)

Investment

®^
.

After four

Special Economic Zones had been established in 1980 in
Shenzhen,

Shantou and Xiamen (Amoy)

Zhuhai,

,

they were

allowed to develop a legislative framework which in many
ways differed from the regulatory investment scheme in

operation in other parts of China. ^^ There began to develop
a

body of special economic zone legislation, most of which

was passed by the provincial governments. The Shenzhen SEZ

turned into a center for legislative experiments testing

various regulations before they were adopted in other
localities and later incorporated into national
legislation.'^

The Regulations on the Special Economic Zones in

Guangdong Province^^ adopted on August 26, 1980 also serve
as a good example of resolving issues arising in the

"central government/local authorities" context. The

Regulations established the basic regulatory framework for
the Guangdong SEZ and were intended to attract wholly owned

foreign enterprises and joint ventures into this zone.
Issues relating to the relationship between national and
local law had been a source of continuing uncertainty with

respect to the legal structure of the SEZs
*^

Jerome A. Cohen & Stuart

Valentine,

J.

the People's Republic of China: Progress,
Chinese L.

161,

177-78

(1987)

See Y.

''

5ee Jerome A. Cohen

*'

Hereafter cited as the SEZ Regulations.

Jao & C.

Leung,

K.
&

Therefore,

Foreign Direct Investment in
Problems and Proposals 1 J.
,

.

*'

C.

.

supra note 49,

Stuart

J.

Valentine,

at 126-27.

supra note 86, at 177-78.
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Article

2

of the SEZ Regulations was aimed directly at

resolving such issues. It provided that national laws would
apply in the SEZs unless countered by a specific provision
in the SEZ Regulations.

interpretation,

Pursuant to this standard

it was necessary to harmonize and integrate

national and SEZ legislation that would permit to

understand adequately the applicable legal framework.'"
The SEZ Regulations provided for a diversity of

preferences in the areas of land-use fees, simplification
of entry and exit procedures and set preferential profit

tax rates

(a

15% enterprise income tax and special

preferential treatment for investments over US$
and high technology projects)

.

5

million

The SEZ Regulations also

established an import duty regime with exemptions
concerning raw and semi-processed materials, machinery and
equipment, means of transportation and other capital goods

brought by enterprises into the special zones for

production purposes.'^
In Ukraine,

issues of delegation of powers and the

relationship between national laws and local regulations
are also a large source of ambiguity. So far,

the

Parliament has not enacted a law that would establish a

regulatory framework for local self -governance and
delineate powers of regional authorities to regulate

'°

See Y.

''

Id.

C.

Jao & C.

K.

Leung,

supra note 49, at 126-27

.

49

certain types of commercial activity within their

respective regions, as well as enact local FEZ legislation
in order to rapidly and effectively deal with institutional

and economic problems faced by FEZs under their

administration

CHAPTER III
COMPONENTS OF THE FEZ FRAMEWORK AND THEIR IMPACT ON FOREIGN
INVESTOR BEHAVIOR

Given the fact that FEZs are created with an intent to
attract foreign capital and technology and boost production
of goods for export,

a

determination whether a particular

zone has been successful or not is based considerably on

that zone's ability to attract foreign investors.
turn,

In its

such ability will obviously rest essentially on the

extent and nature of advantages offered by the zone and how

effective such advantages are in accommodating the needs of
foreign investors. To assure the free zone's success,

zone

authorities should explore various paths of zone
development and pass regulations establishing a framework

within which foreign enterprises can effectively draw on
benefits offered by the zone. On a national level,

comprehensive strategies of host governments are normally

based on the comparative analysis of foreign investors'
objectives and strategies and national policies of the host
countries

'^
.

See Antonie Basile

& Dimitri Germidis,

supra note 19, at

50

25
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Socio-political components
Studies have shown that political stability carries

much weight with foreign investors considering investing in
a

particular country. They make their decisions with due

consideration of the political situation in the host
country, general attitudes of its government and society

towards traditions of regard for international commitments
and recognition of international arbitration." Investors

tend to seek more legal guarantees if the host country does
not have an established favorable foreign investment

climate

.

'"

Furthermore,

legal guarantees lose any meaning if the

foreign investor has doubts about the stability of the

economic system of the host country. In this situation it
is more important that the host country put forth proper

assurances that operations of zone-based foreign

enterprises will be efficiently backed up, if need be,
together with guaranties that the risk of nationalization,

expropriation or unfavorable exchange controls is
insignificant. Back-up arrangements include banking
services,

legal and accounting services,

telecommunications

etc. None of these services can be ensured immediately as

their availability is premised on a certain business
See Thomas L. Brewer, International Investment Dispute Settlement
Procedures: The Evolving Regime For Foreign Direct Investment, 26 Law
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 633, 652-54 (1995).
'^

&
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environment, which is not easy to create in countries with

high levels of governmental control

.

The process of

developing the working business environment and customs is

relatively long and slow, regardless of the efforts made by
the host governments.'^

Some countries hosting FEZs have concluded bilateral

agreements containing investment guarantees.'^ Sri Lanka is
a

good example. This country has signed such agreements

with the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom.
Some of the FEZ host countries are members to the 1965

Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States.'^ Under this Convention,

disputes arising between

an investor and the zone authority are to be submitted to

arbitration. '*

Framework of international economic relations
International trade agreements between developing and

industrialized countries represent a very important aspect
of international economic relations.

In view of the fact

See, e.g., David W. Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the
Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational
Corporation, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 305, 323-27 (1991)
'*

.

'^

See Antonie Basile

& Dimitri Germidis,

supra note 19,

at 30-31.

See Malcolm D. Rowat Multilateral Approaches to Improving the
Investment Climate of Developing Countries the Cases of ICSID and

'*

,

:

MICA,

33 Harv.

Int'l L.J.

103,

136 n.8

(1992).

The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between
States and Nationals of other States, opened for signature Mar. 18,
1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270.
'^

''

For instance,

Sri Lanka and South Korea are members of the

"

.
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that economies of many developing countries depend greatly

upon preferential market access of their exports to foreign
markets, especially those of the industrialized nations,

such international arrangements are of considerable

significance for less developed nations' trade policies in
general and FEZ policies in particular. For example,
customs exemptions that are typical of FEZs have meaning

only in the case when finished products exported from the
zones located in the developing countries are granted

preferential tariff treatment by the industrialized
countries

.

Preferential tariff treatment may be found within
regional agreements, e.g. the Lome Convention, or in

generalized preferences arrangements of a global nature,
such as the Generalized System of Preferences which is

endorsed by the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the
EEC,

Canada, Austria, Japan and some other developed

countries

^°°
.

However, most of such conventions set out

stringent rules of origin requiring that the substantial

processing of products be done so that such products could
be treated as originating in the country concerned. As a

result, products of assembly industries that are most often

found in the FEZs do not enjoy preferential tariff

Convention.

See Antonie Basile

& Dimitri Gernidis,

supra note 19, at 31.

" Id. 32-33.
^°°

28

John H. Jackson et al,
(3d ed. 1995)

Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 1126-
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treatment. Therefore, those countries that have managed to

obtain tariff concessions from the industrialized nations,

whether through regional agreements or "generalized
preferences" arrangements, or whose products are freely

marketed on major foreign markets due to their membership
in some regional group,

increase the attractiveness of

their FEZs for foreign investors

^°^
.

Tax conventions are also a vital means of ensuring a

country's favorable investment climate. They are used to
resolve matters involving conflicts or some lack of harmony

between the basic taxation principles, i.e. the principle
of personality and the principle of territoriality of the
tax.

Presumably, there would be no positive effect from any
tax exemptions and benefits granted to a subsidiary company

operating in the FEZ if the extra profits generated through
such tax advantages will be subject to taxation in the

country of origin of a parent company. Under such a
scenario,

it would lead to the host country foregoing tax

revenues for the benefit of the foreign investor's country
of origin

the result that is often cited among critiques

-

of FEZs.^°^ Therefore,

in the event of double taxation

problems there is a probability that adversely affected
foreign companies operating in the FEZ will resort, so far

^°^

See Antonie Basile

"^

See Ellen

P.

& Dimitri Germidis,

Aprill,

supra note 19, at 33

supra note 80.

55
as their ''multinational" nature allows,

pricing" strategies,

^°^

to "transfer

Or such problems would inevitably

cause the system of tax incentives in the FEZs to collapse,

while affected firms would face the option of either

curtailing their activities or moving all or part of their
operations to a more beneficial location/""
Being aware of the importance and repercussions of

tax-related problems, many countries hosting FEZs have
concluded double taxation agreements with the countries of
foreign investors' origin. For example, the Central and

Eastern European nations have concluded nearly 500 of
income tax conventions. Each of commerce-oriented nations

such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak

Republic and Russia has signed about 40 income tax
treaties. Economically weaker countries such as Belarus,
Moldova, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine

each have signed on average 20 income tax treaties.

^°^

The desire of countries to facilitate FDI flows is

also demonstrated in a large increase in the number of

bilateral investment treaties

(BITs)

.

As of

1

January 1997,

there was a total of 1,330 BITs embracing 162 countries.
^°^
Under transfer pricing, there is a difference between accounting
prices at which intra-company transactions are done and prices that
are determined between companies in an arm's length transaction
setting. By using transfer pricing companies reduce their tax
liability by transferring profits to countries with low taxes. See
Jose D. Amado, supra note 10, at 116 n.l67.
^°*

See Antonie Basile

^°^

See Walter H. Diamond,

& Dimitri Germidis,

supra note 19, at 33.

supra note 36.
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The pattern of bilateral investment treaties has changed

significantly. In the past, essentially all BITs involved
one industrialized country as a party and such countries

accounted for 83 per cent of all BITs in the late 1980s.
But this situation had changed significantly by 1996 when
822 BITs

countries

(62%)

of the worldwide total involved developed

^°^
.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have

pursued the "BIT active" approach since the late 1980s,
concluding many such treaties among themselves, as well as
with developed and developing countries. Developing
countries also started entering into BITs with one another,

increasingly with other developing countries in the same
region. To date,

16 per cent of all BITs are among

developing countries.^"

Physical and administrative infrastructures
The effectiveness of physical and administrative

infrastructures is often one of the major prerequisites for
^°*

5ee World Investment Report 1997,

supra note

2,

at 19-20.

Among developing countries China has concluded the largest number
of treaties. Next are the Republic of Korea, Argentina and Egypt.
African countries recently concluded BITs at a slower pace than in
previous decades, concluding to date 67 BITs. Developing countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean have been energetically taking up this
BIT practice recently. By 1996, 31 countries in that region had
concluded one or more BITs, with a total of 261. 37 of these treaties
are between countries in the region. There has also been a dramatic
increase in the number of BITs concluded by Asian and Pacific
countries in the 1990s. Currently, 33 countries in that region have
concluded a total of 4 91 BITs)
5ee World Investment Report 1997, supra
note 2, at 20.
^°^

.

.
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a

given locality to successfully accommodate a FEZ

^°®
.

An

appropriate business environment encompassing the FEZ is an
indispensable prerequisite for attracting foreign direct
investment. For example, no financial incentives will be
able to motivate foreign investors to set up operation in
the FEZ if they have to face long delays in the shipment of

raw materials,

semi-finished products, components and

manufactured goods

^°'
.

There are distinguished two types of infrastructure in
FEZs

:

physical and administrative. Physical infrastructure

consists of facilities, energy and water supplies,

communications networks and buildings etc. For example, the

Buenaventura FEPZ in Colombia and Santo Tomas de Castillo
in Guatemala were seriously hampered by poor communications

systems that did not have quality international links. Poor
port infrastructures in Kandla,

India led industrial

enterprises located there to use port facilities in Bombay,

which caused disproportionate additional transport and

administrative expenditures. Conversely, the Santa Cruz
zone in India drew successfully upon its close location to

Bombay airport. So, it is important that free zones have
adequate physical infrastructures as it would require
smaller amounts of initial investment to set up or upgrade
See Rodolfo Villalobos & Bruce B. Barshop, Social Infrastructure
Needs of the Maquiladora Industry: A Proposal for United States
Corporate Contributions, 22 St. Mary's L.J. 701, 708-09 (1991)
^°*

"' See United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations,

95-96.

supra note 73, at
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production facilities, thus making the free zones more
attractive to foreign investors and ensuring earlier
returns on the investment/^"

Administrative infrastructure is also important in
achieving the overall success of FEZs

.

Therefore, host

countries ought to ensure that the zones' administrative

infrastructures operate efficiently and promptly. This
includes effective application of relevant rules,

regulations and streamlined procedures, as well as
avoidance of unnecessary bureaucratic procrastination and

overreaching in such areas as management and control,
grants of permits and licenses, conclusion of leases or

contracts for transfer of real property, and customs

payments etc/^^

Overreaching regulation is a problem characteristic of
many countries, including modern administrative states in
the industrialized countries. Foreign companies were

discouraged to invest in China because of difficulties
caused by extensive and ad hoc government intervention,

with inconsistent and unpredictable regulation being its
The Chinese government recognized rather

typical feature.

''^^

^"

See Antonie Basile

& Dimitri Germidis,

'''

Id.

supra note 19, at 36-37.

at 38.

"^

See Jerome A. Cohen & Stuart J. Valentine, supra note 86, at 201
(sometimes, government agencies will directly interfere with the
performance of contracts by imposing new rules, conditions, or fees
that affect the profitability of the venture."); see also Pat K. Chew,
Political Risk and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of Protection
and Predictability?, 34 Va. J. Int l L 615, 625 (1994) (significant
'

.

.

.
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promptly that there was an excessive level of government
involvement impeding economic development and created a

domestic legal framework that ensured foreign investors
adequate opportunity to legally counteract bureaucratic

overreaching

^^^
.

Furthermore,

the adequacy of administrative

infrastructures in FEZs depends on the fact whether central
governments have delegated certain powers to the zones'

administrative bodies so that they could resolve problems
arising from zone operations

^^^
.

A good example of

delegation of powers is the Masan FEPZ in Sri Lanka where
the zone's authority has been granted wide powers.

It

provides authorization of foreign investment and controls a
wide range of back-up services for enterprises, basically
banking,

insurance, transport and other services.

^^^

changes in legislation " ultimately alter the rules of the game to
such a degree that investors' financial calculations of the return on
their investments and their original decisions to make the direct
foreign investments, may be based upon inaccurate fundamental
assumptions about the investment climate)
See David L. Weller, Note: The Bureaucratic Heavy Hand in China:
Legal Means for Foreign Investors to Challenge Agency Action, 98 Colum.
L. Rev. 1238 (1998); see also Jiang Ping, Chinese Legal Reform:
Achievements, Problems and Prospects, 9 J. Chinese L. 67, 71 (1995)
(noting that "one of the proposed goals of the new contract law is to
prevent excessive state intervention into the formation of contracts
and thereby to facilitate the operation of the market economy")
^^^

^"

See Antonie Basile

"^ Id.

& Dimitri Germidis,

supra note 19, at 37-39 (1984)

.
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Investor qualification and motivations in FEZs

Benefits and incentives offered by FEZs are designed
to stimulate the interest of foreign investors.

Foreign

enterprises make use of tax, financial and other
incentives,

low production costs, existing manufacturing

facilities, buildings and infrastructures etc. offered by
FEZs. Besides,

investors may use free zones as testing

grounds to sound out a host country's general climate at
low costs and on an expedited basis, or explore

possibilities of expansion into third country markets.

^^^

Another factor that has an impact on foreign investor
presence and behavior in a FEZ is a possibility of access
to the host country's domestic market.

Some commentators

suggest that it is difficult for a country to attract

foreign investment into its FEZs pursuing exclusively

export-oriented goals without offering a certain degree of
access for zone produced goods to its domestic market. As a
result,

countries that have relatively big internal markets

could draw on letting zone -manufactured products sell on
their markets under partial or full duty payment
arrangements, making their FEZs more appealing to foreign

investors

^^^
.

Such countries as Brazil, Mexico, China and

Korea that have large domestic markets have permitted
^^*

See Herbert Grubel,

supra note 66.

"^ Presumably, there is no reason to put in place customs protection
mechanisms that often lead to limited industrial development even
though countries with large internal markets are less susceptible to
such negative influence. See Antonie Basile & Dimitri Germidis, supra note
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foreign investors to sell a portion of zone-manufactured

products domestically as part of incentive programs to

motivate foreign enterprises to set up operation in their
FEZs.'''

What concerns the host country's decision to allow the

marketing of zone -manufactured products in its domestic
it should be noted that such policy may often come

market,

into conflict between foreign investors'

interests and

objectives of local industries because of the fear that
domestic products will meet tough competition from FEZ-made
products.

^^'

This problem seems to be more acute in the

textiles, clothing and footwear industries and,
in the electronics industry.

degree,

to a lesser

^^°

A possibility that the host country may explore
without a risk of running afoul of local interests is to
grant access to its internal market to those zone-

manufactured products that do not compete with domestic
producers. While this is not a common feature of FEZs, such
an incentive may act as an additional inducement for

prospective investors

19,
^^^

^^^
.

at 20-21.

UNCTAD

^" See

:

EPFZS

IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Jose D. Amado,

^^°

See Antonie Basile

121

See Jose D. Amado,

at

6

.

supra note 10, at 125-26.

& Dimitri Gerwidis,

supra note 19, at 39-41.

supra note 10, at 125-26
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Access to the markets of regional structures, such as
the Andean Group or CARICOM,^^^ may also stimulate investors
to invest in the developing member states with an intent to
be able to freely market zone -manufactured products in

countries other than the host nation. ^^^ Ukraine's

relatively large internal market and nearness to Russia and
other ex-Soviet republics look rather promising to foreign
investors who could use Ukraine as a platform to expand
into these countries' markets.

^^'

See John H. Jackson

"^

See Jose D. Amado,

et al,

supra note 100, at 464-65

supra note 10, at 126.

(3d ed.

1995)

.

.

CHAPTER IV
INCENTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS
It is

undisputedly important for countries hosting

FEZs to offer packages of viable incentives to stimulate

inflows of foreign capital.

In this,

developing countries

face a highly complicated task because it is equally

imperative that they tailor and implement incentive

measures which are really advantageous for foreign
investors and target free zones generally and, at the same
time,

do not put a strain on the countries'

scare

resources
Usually, a host country attempts to reach an ideal

balance between granting incentive measures considered to
be adequate by the investing community and reducing the

costs incurred by the country or the zone in connection

therewith. The adequacy of incentive measures is

customarily analyzed within the framework of a concrete
country's FEZ in light of many factors, some of which are
unique to the host country. ^^^ For example, two currently

operating free zones in Jordan, Aqaba and Zarqa, offer a
wide range of financial and other incentives and
exemptions. Foreign and local companies established in

See Antonie Basile

& Dimitri Germidis,

63

supra note 19,

at 40-41

;

:

64

these free zones enjoy the following incentives and

exemptions
a)

profits of projects operating in the free
zones are exempt from income and social affairs
taxes for a period of 12 years;

b)

salaries and bonuses of foreign employees

working in the free zones are exempt from income
and social affairs taxes;
c)

all commodities imported or exported through
the free zones and bound for external markets are

exempt from customs, imports and all other taxes
and fees;
d)

buildings erected in the free zones are exempt
from license fees and land is exempt from property
taxes;

e)

transfer of capital invested in the free zones
and the profits accrued from them is permitted to

anywhere outside Jordan, without any constraints or

restrictions
f)

products of free zone industries are exempt
from customs payments in the case of their sale on
the local market,

limited by the cost of the local

material and the expenses which go into their

manufacture

^^^

^^^
.

See http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/economylO.html

1999)

.

(visited Mar.
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The Ukrainian FEZ law contains a general pronouncement

concerning FEZ incentives. In relevant part it states that
favorable customs conditions will be provided in special
(free)

economic zones ^

[preferential]

e.g.,

tax exemptions,

specific

fiscal procedures, banking and credits and a

state investment system.

Incentives offered by particular

FEZs are enumerated in a separate piece of legislation (it

may be a law or a presidential degree) establishing

respective zones.

Tax incentives
It stands for the

proposition that tax exemptions of

profits received by enterprises in FEZs do not seem to be a

major influencing factor in the investors' motivation

whether to invest in a particular FEZ or not. As a rule,
tax exemptions are provided for periods of 5-10 years. Host

countries grant exemptions of two kinds: total or partial.
In addition,

incentives,

tax exemptions may be complemented by other
i.e.

deferred or free depreciation schemes.

Some of these supplemental measures have meaning only in
the case of partial type exemptions

^^^
.

Tax incentives offered by China have proved to be
successful. For example, tax benefits in Shenzhen and the

other SEZs in China are generally the same irrespective of
the form a venture with foreign investment takes. Usually,

See Antonie Basile

& Dimitri Germidis,

supra note 19, at 40-41.
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there is provided a 15% income tax for a business of any
as well as there is no tax imposed on repatriation of

form,

profits.

In addition,

the 22 Articles establish a 10%

income tax rate with respect to SEZ-based "export

enterprises" exporting 70% or more of their annual
production. The same tax rate applies,

for each of the

three years, to "technologically advanced enterprises" that
are entitled to a special tax reduction. Similar incentives

have also been adopted by the fourteen coastal cities and
the economic and technological development zones that each

such city has established pursuant to Chinese national

legislation

^^^
.

Surveys show that FEZs which are generally viewed to
be successful offer quite moderate tax advantages to

investors. An inference can be drawn that FEZs providing
tax exemptions for unlimited periods of time are losing

revenue without necessity
to be quite successful,
all,

.

'^^^

Some zones, which have proven

do not offer tax concessions at

for example FEZs in the Philippines. Normally,

offer,

FEZs

among others, such tax incentives: exemptions from

export duties and other taxes,

including professional tax,

property tax, local and regional taxes; exemptions from
income tax for foreign personnel employed in the FEZ;

partial or total exemptions from the tax on profits; total
^"

5ee Jerome A. Cohen

&

Stuart

J.

Valentine,

supra note 86, at 177-

78.
12B

See Ellen

P.

Aprill,

supra note 80, at 1346.
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tax exemption from income tax, general sales tax, export
tax,

municipal tax, import tax.^^^

Financial incentives

Availability of sources of finance at reduced interest
rates is arguably a much more viable incentive than tax

exemptions in view of the fact that enterprises in FEZs
finance most of their fixed assets through loans. Linkage
of FEZs in many countries with offshore financial centers

and free trade zones seems to have produced quite positive
effects. For instance, Sri Lanka adopted measures

supporting the establishment of foreign banks in order to
ensure that FEZ-located enterprises have access to sources
of international finance.

^^°

The number of zones that offer financial facilities to

enterprises is relatively small. Kandla in India and Bataan
in the Philippines are among such zones.

In many countries,

firms make use of well-established capital and financial

markets,

obtaining loans on a contractual basis and under

reasonable conditions from international financial sources.
For example,

exporting enterprises get preferential rates

of interest to finance their exports in many Far Eastern

countries

^^^
.

^^'

See Jose D. Amado,

"°

See Antonie Basile
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Id.

supra note 10, at 115.

& Dimitri Germidis,

supra note 19, at 40-41 (19841

.
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There exist situations where there is a reasonable

possibility that, in the absence of effective controls,
scarce local financial resources may be diverted from use
in the economy of a host country.

In such cases competent

authorities undertake measures to avert conflicts of
interest by ensuring the development of links between

financing networks and foreign banks within the FEZs
Generally,

foreign banks 'operating in the FEZs are

permitted to engage in offshore operations and enjoy
significant tax advantages. Sri Lanka serves as a good

illustration in this regard. Companies acting in its FEPZ
are unable to obtain financing for their fixed capital

investment through the domestic market and therefore they
have to turn to the banks that are allowed to finance off-

shore operations."^

A foreign exchange regime is also important for
attracting foreign investors. Ideally, foreign investors
would prefer to enjoy maximum freedom to transact business

operations in both local and foreign currencies, repatriate
the profits earned in host countries or reinvest them in

these countries."^ Therefore,

regards exchange controls,

most FEZs have regulations permitting unlimited transfers
of profits as from the first year of production and

"^ Id.
^"

See Frenkel & Sukhman, New Foreign Investment Regimes of Russia and
other Republics of the Former U.S.S.R: a Legislative Analysis and
Historical Perspective, 16 B.C. Int l & Comp L. Rev. 321, 327 (1993).
'

.
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repatriation of the total amount of the initial investment
after a comparatively short period.

"*

Other incentive measures
There exists a wide variety of other incentive

measures that are offered in FEZs throughout the world.
They range from grants of capital when a host country is

willing defray part of the cost of the fixed assets in a
project to payment of costs associated with personnel
training. Sometimes,

in order to stimulate transfers of

technology, administrative bodies of FEZs themselves

provide financing for transfer of technology contacts to
acquire equipment and machinery

.

'^^^

Incentive measures also include interest or rent
subsidies, utility discounts or grants for certain services
in the areas of marketing,

product development and other

activities regarded to be valuable for the FEZ or the host

country as

a

whole. Foreign investors are allowed to lease

at low prices various facilities and buildings necessary

for operation of their enterprises.^^*

"*

See Antonie Basile

"' Id.
136

Id.

at 41.

& Dimitri Germidis,

supra note 19, at 37-40 (1984)

.
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Constraints
Incentive packages provided by FEZs are accompanied by
a number of constraints and requirements with which foreign

investors ought to comply. Constraints ranging from

restrictions on repatriation of profits to foreign

ownership of land and foreign exchange controls are found
in foreign investment policies of many host countries/"

Studies have shown that government constraints on foreign
investment in general have usually been more extensive in

developing countries than in developed nations. Generally,
the developed nations tend to monitor foreign investment

through registration and screening requirements, imposing

restrictions on a need-be basis. The developing countries
seem to prefer establishing blanket statutory prohibitions
on certain types of foreign investments."^

While developing countries have varying policies
toward foreign direct investment that range from active

solicitation to complete rejection, many of them have taken
strong positions concerning needs to exercise

a

certain

degree of control over, or even impose limitations on,

foreign investment. Some developing nations that have

extended certain concessions meant to attract foreign
investors are reevaluating this approach and looking at

measures that would circumscribe the scope of foreign
See, e.g., Carlos E. Martinez, Early Lessons of Latin American
Privatizations, 15 Suffolk Transnat l L J 468, 510 (1992).

^^''

'

.

^^'

See Howard B. Berke,

.

supra note 17, at 243-44.
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investment in certain industries and limit the activity of

foreign-owned companies

^^^
.

Generally, FEZ authorities are empowered to approve

applications of foreign companies to set up in their
respective zones as part of the screening process to ensure
that applicant firms meet certain legislatively prescribed

criteria. Such procedures may constitute a significant

constraint, especially in those counties that do not have

simplified administrative procedures

^^°
.

Among other constraints that are often complained of
by foreign investors are amounts of paper work required in
FEZs

.

Complicated paperwork is a mire where a lot of

foreign companies may get bogged down. Absent other cogent

incentives or promising prospects such as access to the
host country's big domestic market,

some foreign firms are

discouraged from further involvement with FEZs.
Commentators suggest that host governments should try to
simplify paperwork procedures and cut down bureaucratic
overreaching. FEZs could offer foreign investors relief not
only in the form of preferential tariffs and customs
regimes, but also relieve them from time-consuming and

complicated paperwork. Time, money and efforts that
companies save due to streamlined procedures and downsized
red tape procrastination may serve as a good incentive for

"' Id.
^*°

See Antonie Basile

& Dimitri Germidis,

supra note 19, at 41.
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foreign investors to set up operation in the FEZs
example,

.

For

the Mexican government recognized possible

benefits that could be achieved through elimination of this
kind of constraint. In September 1985, Mexico launched a

comprehensive program whose objective was to ensure

simplification and administrative decentralization of
Mexico's maquiladora industry.

See Michael J. Tucker,

^^^

supra note 39, at 136-37

CONCLUSION
Studies have shown that there is no clear-cut approach
the host country should take to ensure the success of its

FEZs in achieving a variety of political, economic and

social goals, while at the same time minimizing negative

effects and costs associated with FEZ operations. In this

work an attempt has been made to analyze basic aspects of
FEZs and relevant policies that have ensured the success of

many FEZs in South-East Asia and Latin America. FEZs that
have offered adequate physical and administrative

infrastructures, provided back-up banking and insurance
services,

communications systems and easy access to

financial resources have been generally successful. Much

depends on host countries' ability and willingness to
remove institutional, legal and political impediments to
the creation of an environment suitable for foreign

investment within their FEZs. At the same time, the

experience of every country in the area of FEZs remains
unique due to diverse political, economic and cultural
factors existing in that particular country.
As has been noted,

currently FEZs in Ukraine exist

only on paper. Before embarking on a full-scale program

aimed at developing effective FEZs, Ukraine needs to
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.
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resolve the following important political, legal and

economic problems
First,

it seems important that Ukraine design and

implement a well-balanced FEZ agenda which,
a

in addition to

liberal foreign investment regime comprising viable

incentives,

removal of purely bureaucratic constraints and

requirements bound to reduce negative consequences usually
caused by foreign investment, will allow it to make

particular arrangements of a "highly liberal" nature. Such
arrangements could arguably include the following packages:
extra FEZ benefits and incentives inapplicable to the rest
of the country and varying from zone to zone,

easy access

of zone-based enterprises to international financing,

simplified administrative procedures, absence of certain

legislatively prescribed foreign exchange controls,

permission to sell some categories of zone-manufactured
products on the domestic market under partial customs duty
arrangements etc. Being confined to the FEZs, the

aforementioned arrangements would minimize risks that
general

"

a

highly- liberal " foreign investment regime is known

to generate

Second, at the initial stage, Ukraine could use its

FEZs as laboratories in which new market-based legislation

and economic strategies could be tested. This practice,

which was used, for example, in the Special Economic Zones
in China,

has proved to be quite successful. The Chinese

central government delegated certain legislative and

.
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administrative powers to SEZ authorities, which were then
able to deal quickly and effectively with institutional and

economic problems connected with zone operations on a local
Currently, the Ukrainian central government seems to

scale.

support the "central control and supervision" approach

under which it will retain the function to regulate and
supervise the activities of FEZs in Ukraine, while no

significant amount of powers will be delegated to zone

authorities

Under present circumstances, the approach of the
central government to centralize control of FEZs appears to
have certain merits. Regional authorities, being frustrated

with the slow economic development of their regions, have

flooded the central government with proposals to create
FEZs.

If,

supposedly, all or a significant portion of the

proposals were approved, Ukraine would have dozens of
FEZs.^"^ Given that,

as this study shows,

FEZ success

depends on such factors as availability of attractive tax
and financial incentives, preferential customs regimes,

access of zone-manufactured products to the domestic
market,

and the existence of adequate physical and

administrative infrastructures, the free zones in Ukraine
would require significant expenditure of efforts and funds
well before they bring in any results at all.

Suffice it to say that Ukraine plans create 15 special economic
zones in 1999-2000. See Irina Berezovska, supra note 1, at 7.

^•^
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The costs of creating a favorable FEZ institutional

and commercial framework multiplied by a large number of

potential FEZs would arguably place an undue burden on

Ukraine's economy and society as a whole. In particular,
foregone revenue, the disadvantaged position of local

enterprises in comparison with their foreign counterparts,
differences between national and zone policies, adverse
political implications of zone operation will likely

outweigh putative benefits of the FEZs. Given these
concerns,

the central government and its reticent attitude

to issues of FEZs in general and the issue of delegation of

powers to zone authorities in particular can be understood.
On the other hand, most of the arguments cited by the

central government in support of its position would lose

their force if only two or three FEZs were to be created as
part of a special government program launched to put

Ukrainian FEZs into operation. At the initial stage, two or
three FEZs could provide to foreign investors a

comprehensive package, including extra incentives and
benefits, preferential customs and foreign exchange
regimes, basic infrastructures and streamlined procedures.

These advantages, coupled with special powers granted by
the central government to local authorities to discharge

zone day-by-day affairs, would probably entice some foreign

investors to the zones. Such benefits as the demonstration
effect of zone operations, availability of testing grounds
for market-based policies,

relevant experience, generation
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of employment and attraction of foreign capital will

apparently outweigh the strain that tax and financial
incentives and other zone-related costs will put on the
rest of the country in general.

In the long run,

the evaluation of the initial operating FEZs,

based on

the Ukrainian

government could adopt general decisions, i.e. whether to

proceed further with new FEZs,. or fine tune its FEZ
strategies with respect to the existing zones.
Finally,

reference should be made of the Ukrainian

national business and trade laws, which lay down a general

regulatory framework within which business actors operate.
Some of these laws are still inconsistent, ambiguous and
broad.

If not changed,

they will arguably produce, together

with poorly crafted economic and legally policies, negative
synergy effects on Ukraine's economy and legal environment
as a whole.

Thus,

no matter how well-drafted,

effective and

investor-friendly foreign investment or FEZ legislation may
be,

it is stillborn without a comprehensive body of free

market -oriented business and trade laws and regulations
that,

along with the viable rule of law system and

enforcement mechanisms, constitute the pillars of any
market economy and democracy.
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